Supply Chain
When cash suddenly vanishes from the channel: lessons from a liquidity shock

Every few years, a distribution channel is hit by a sudden shock: a currency change, a banking disruption, a strike, a natural disaster, a pandemic lockdown. Overnight, traders can’t pay, or customers can’t buy.
One of the sharpest such shocks in India was the 2016 withdrawal of high-value currency notes. In a trade that runs largely on cash, wholesale markets for auto parts went quiet for days.
What makes that episode instructive is not the shock itself. It is how differently two groups of companies in the same market came through it.
Two companies, one shock
In the first days after the shock:
- Some companies saw an immediate drop in sales.
- Others saw hardly any change, compared with the same days in previous years.
By the end of the month, the picture had reversed:
- The first group was back to normal, and some were doing better than before.
- The second group was badly hit, with weak sales that month and worries about the next two quarters.
Why? The difference lay in how their supply chains were run: push or pull.
Why push companies looked fine, then weren’t
Companies that push stock into the channel have a familiar pattern: little billing in the first two weeks, rising in the third, peaking at month end.
When the shock hit early in the month, little was being billed anyway, so nothing seemed to change. The damage came at month end, when distributors were expected to take the usual big month-end stock. They couldn’t:
- Retailers rushed to pay distributors with the cash they still held, clearing dues and even paying in advance, just to use it.
- Distributors were suddenly holding plenty of cash, but couldn’t deposit it fast enough with banks in disarray. They couldn’t pay the companies.
- Their accounts with the companies went into credit lock, and they couldn’t buy more.
Primary sales collapsed.
Why pull companies recovered fast
Companies using pull replenishment supply each distributor and retailer only what they actually sold, ordered daily and replenished often. So when consumption froze for a few days, the signal reached them immediately, and sales dropped at once.
But as consumption restarted, even at a lower level, so did their sales, without any schemes or extra credit. Retailers, holding very little stock and never asked to buy in bulk, used whatever money they had to buy the small quantities they needed.
There was a bonus. While push companies’ products went missing because their distributors couldn’t buy, pull companies stayed available. Some retailers switched to them for good, shop by shop, part by part.
The vicious cycle after the shock
For push companies, the usual response makes things worse. Faced with piles of finished goods, they extend credit and offer extra discounts. Distributors, already struggling to pay and already holding stock pushed in the past, are offered still more, often of slow items. Their money gets tied up further, credit locks spread, and fast-moving parts start running short in the market. Retailers, already facing weaker consumption, now also face supply gaps.
Upstream, the same thing happens. With finished goods piling up and collections falling short of salaries and rent, companies cut production and delay payments to suppliers. Suppliers, holding their own stock, cut further, and may lay off skilled workers who are hard to get back. Shortages of fast-moving parts and surpluses of slow ones both grow.
Becoming antifragile
Nassim Nicholas Taleb uses the word antifragile for systems that gain from shocks instead of breaking. A pull-based supply chain is closer to antifragile than a push-based one, because it adjusts to real consumption every day.
Imagine a chain where:
- plants produce only what the company warehouse has sold,
- the company warehouse holds around ten days of stock and always has the full range,
- distributors hold around two weeks, refilled according to their sales.
For the warehouse to work on ten days of stock, plants must refill it within a week or so. With raw materials and components available, most component plants can.
When a shock hits such a chain, it isn’t blindsided: sales fall when consumption falls, and recover when consumption recovers. It doesn’t build a mountain of stock and receivables during the shock. And it is ready to gain share as soon as the market turns.
Three numbers tell you how exposed your own channel is, and you can pull them this week:
- The share of each month’s billing that happens in the last week. Above a third, and a shock in the final days of a month hits you hard.
- Days of stock at your distributors, item by item. If many hold two months or more of some items while missing others, a liquidity squeeze will freeze them quickly.
- How many distributors hit a credit block in a normal month. If it is already common, it will spread fast when cash dries up.
None of these needs a forecast of the next shock. They show how much your channel depends on pushing stock, and how quickly it can follow real consumption when the shock comes.
Shocks can’t be predicted. A supply chain that follows real consumption doesn’t need to predict them.
The 2016 episode was not the first such shock, and the 2020 lockdowns were not the last. The lesson holds for whatever comes next.